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Given the chance, many low-income families can acquire assets and become more financially secure.
Conservatives and liberals increasingly agree that government’s role in this transition requires going beyond
traditional antipoverty programs to encourage savings, homeownership, private pensions, and microenter-
prise. The Urban Institute’s Opportunity and Ownership Project and Retirement Policy Project reports present
findings, analyses, and recommendations to increase asset building. 
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Despite decades of significant tax subsi-dies for pensions and retirement ac-
counts, most Americans retire with little or no
pension saving. The federal government will give
out more than $750 billion in estimated tax subsi-
dies for pension plans between 2007 and 2011,
and yet, many low- to middle-income families
have too few financial assets to afford retirement. 
The United States needs a pension system
that addresses 21st century needs, one that com-
plements and is able to accompany any Social
Security reform the nation is likely to see in the
near future. This paper describes one way for-
ward, following the lead of a new system to ac-
celerate the growth in personal retirement assets
about to be implemented in the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom moved boldly to reform its
private pension system by encouraging signifi-
cantly greater accumulation of pension assets and
protections in old age for the vast majority of the
population. 
The United States has its own pension history,
so it must apply the British lesson to its own cir-
cumstances. This paper suggests that it is possible
to create—using the language of the pension
world1—a “Super Simple” saving plan that would
provide a basic, low-cost, easily administrable
plan with the potential to increase significantly
the retirement assets available to moderate- and
middle-income individuals. 
The basic features of the Super Simple plan
resemble the U.K. reform plan, but within a U.S.
context. The Super Simple plan would (1) create
solid minimum levels of employer contributions
for low- and moderate-income workers, (2) include
automatic contribution features for employees who
do not formally opt out, (3) remove many of the
complex discrimination rules surrounding retire-
ment plans, (4) create a significant government
match for savers to replace the largely symbolic
match now in existence for only a few taxpayers,
and (5) streamline today’s multiple 401(k)-type
plans through a simple plan design attractive to
employers and employees alike. 
We realize that we are suggesting the most
substantive set of reforms since the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Almost
all subsequent reforms have mainly patched the
existing system while trying not to take any
options away. Any simplicity gains under one
new option considered in isolation were often
more than reduced by the complexity of having
so many options to understand. Most important,
their effect on increasing the net saving of house-
holds has been modest, if any. A few reforms have
been quite creative—particularly the movement
toward auto-enrollment. But their primary failing
is their inability to establish a base of retirement
security for low- to middle-income individuals. 
The problems posed by the pending increase
in retirees (soon close to one-third of the adult
population will be receiving Social Security), the
unavoidable reform of Social Security, and our
poor record on national saving despite the abun-
dance of available tax subsidies now compel
action. And they require more than ad hoc tinker-
ing. It is time for a radical structural change, yet
one rooted in simplicity and in the American pri-
vate pension system. And, maybe in this case, our
mother (country) does have something to teach us. 
Executive Summary
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In mid-2006, Congress passed significantpension legislation. The fourth major pen-
sion bill enacted in three years, the Pension
Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) has been heralded as
creating “the foundation on which the future of
our retirement system rests.”2 This report argues
that much more needs to be done. The paramount
problem is that most Americans, particularly
low- and moderate-income Americans, don’t
have the minimal amount of savings they will
need when they retire (Munnell et al. 2007). PPA’s
reforms fail to provide a comprehensive solution
to this problem.
Our analysis begins with a description of the
challenges facing the American retirement sys-
tem. We next examine some of the obstacles to
saving by low- and moderate-income Americans
embedded in today’s employer-based 401(k) plan
system. We then show how pension system
reforms now under way in the United Kingdom
are structured to increase private saving for re-
tirement income. 
Similar reforms could simplify and improve
the American private pension system for the
benefit of all savers. This report describes how—
using the language of the pension world—a
“Super Simple” saving plan could form the basis
of a 21st century savings policy that stimulates
increased savings behavior through better pen-
sion plan design. Replacing most of today’s
401(k) plans, the Super Simple plan could signif-
icantly increase the retirement assets available to
low- and moderate-income individuals. Several
crucial elements of the Super Simple aim at the
same goal as the U.K. reform: creating a mini-
mum base of individual, employer, and govern-
ment contributions for most workers. 
The Need for a Better 
Private Pension System
Sometime in the next 25 years, the American
retirement system is headed for a train wreck or
a major overhaul. Simply put, the three primary
sources of retirement income—Social Security,
pensions, and personal savings—are faltering.
Although Social Security is not the subject of this
paper, this mainstay of retirement income for
many Americans is clearly due for a major reform
that could reduce benefits to restore balance. 
The vast majority of workers goes into retire-
ment with only modest retirement assets relative
to the value of their Social Security and Medicare
benefits. Most Americans are not saving enough
on their own to be prepared financially for what
now adds up to about two decades of retirement
for many single adults and more than a quarter-
century for the longer living of two spouses.
Meanwhile, the private pension system needs
substantial reform (Perun 2006). Under current
trends, it seems inevitable that Americans will
have to choose between higher tax rates and
lower retirement benefits to support an aging
society. Another alternative is that people might
work longer to save more, especially since they
are living longer (MacDonald 2006; Penner,
Perun, and Steuerle 2003). 
One part of the solution, then, is to scale up
the American private pension system to provide
more assets for retirement. Historically, the U.S.
private pension system, despite the size of its
aggregate assets, has never provided significant
resources for more than a minority of the work-
force. For decades, for instance, it has covered
fewer than half of private-sector workers.
Today’s many part-time and mobile employees
never qualify for their employers’ plans. In addi-
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tion, most retirees cannot count on defined bene-
fit plans for retirement income despite PPA’s new
rules, or perhaps because of them. At one point,
the decline in defined benefit plans might have
been attributed mainly to plan terminations by
smaller employers or employers in distressed
industries. Now, however, even healthy compa-
nies are terminating their plans. Many others are
either not admitting new workers or reducing
future benefit accruals for everyone (Munnell 
et al. 2006). Few private companies are creating
new defined benefit plans.
The pension system today is an intricate sys-
tem with multiple plan types characterized by
complex rules and regulations (Perun and Steuerle
2005b). Plans are complicated to administer
because of regulatory requirements, the sophisti-
cation of investment products and services, and
the evolving American workplace.3 The result is
a private pension system requiring significant-
administrative support with associated fees and
costs paid to human resource personnel, account-
ants and auditors, insurance companies, consult-
ants, salespeople, actuarial firms, legal advisors,
and financial intermediaries. Such costs tend to
lower U.S. output, raise product costs for produc-
ing stateside, and lower the net returns from sav-
ing to workers.4
The Need for a Better 
401(k) Plan System 
Without question, the 401(k) plan has been the
growth engine in the private pension system over
the past 10 years (Copeland 2005, 2007).5 In a
401(k)-type plan, workers can save a portion of
their wages for retirement in return for special tax
benefits. By one measure, 401(k)-type plans have
been an enormous success. They represent 70 per-
cent of all defined contribution plans, 75 percent of
all defined contribution plan assets, more than 
85 percent of all defined contribution plan par-
ticipants, and 40 percent of all private-sector re-
tirement assets (defined benefit and defined
contribution plan assets combined) (Vanguard
2004). Despite its popularity, however, today’s
401(k) plan system has significant, inherent de-
fects that affect the ability of low- and moderate-
income savers to accumulate assets for retirement. 
Little Saving Subsidy for Low- 
and Middle-Income Workers 
Between 2007 and 2011, income tax subsidies to
pension plans are estimated to cost more than
$750 billion, and a large proportion will flow to
401(k) plans (Joint Committee on Taxation 2007a).
Because the value of these subsidies increases
with income, higher-income savers receive incen-
tives to save that they generally do not need,
while few benefits flow to those around median
income or below (roughly, less than $50,000)
(Orszag 2004). 
Further, in 401(k) plans, low- and moderate-
income savers lose an important tax subsidy—
exempting employer contributions from the
Social Security tax. Most economists suggest that
such subsidies over time benefit employees by
reducing the cost of labor. In 401(k)s and most
other pension plans, employer contributions,
even matching contributions, are exempt. Em-
ployee contributions are not; contributions by
employees earning under the Social Security
wage base ($102,000 in 2008) remain fully subject
to Social Security tax. With the rapid evolution of
401(k) plans and their increasing dependence on
employee contributions as a funding source, those
employer subsidies are being lost. Meanwhile, the
income tax exclusion for contributions to either
type of plan, which rises in value with income tax
rates, is retained. Thus, low- and middle-income
employees are increasingly left with a smaller
share of total subsidies.
In recent years, Congress created a new sub-
sidy for low- and moderate-income workers—the
saver’s credit. This credit, however, is more sym-
bol than substance. It is a nonrefundable credit, so,
unlike the Social Security tax exclusion, many low-
and moderate-income savers who owe no income
taxes are not eligible for it. Yet it is phased out at
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moderate income levels. The maximum benefit is
almost never available! The subsidy phases out
before taxpayers can earn enough income to pay
enough tax to be eligible for the maximum benefit
(Purcell 2007). Finally, it is paid directly to taxpay-
ers, not deposited into a retirement account, so few
believe that much of the subsidy ends up in retire-
ment saving. 
The ultimate evidence of the saver’s credit’s
trivial effect is that it is estimated to cost only 
$690 million in 2007, falling to $580 million in
2012—about $5 per worker. By way of contrast, in
the same year, the net exclusion of pension con-
tributions and earnings from the income tax is
estimated to cost more than $100 billion (Office of
Management and Budget 2007). The net exclu-
sion of employer contributions from the Social
Security tax is not estimated by the government
in the tax expenditure budget but, by simple com-
parison with the income tax exclusion, it must
involve revenue losses on the order of tens of bil-
lions of dollars a year. 
Low Savings Rates 
Saving through a 401(k) plan requires “the em-
ployee to decide whether or not to join the plan,
how much to contribute, how to invest the contri-
butions and when to re-balance, what to do about
company stock, whether to roll over accumula-
tions when changing jobs, and how to use the
money in retirement” (Munnell and Sundén 2006,
abstract). In response, many potential savers
exhibit “inertia” and fail to save.6 Recent studies
confirm that savers are often inhibited by the
many decisions and choices required in 401(k)
plans (Beshears et al. 2006; Choi, Laibson, and
Madrigan 2006, 2007; Gale and Iwry 2005;
Goodman and Orszag 2005; Mitchell, Utkus, and
Yang 2005a, 2005b; Mitchell et al. 2005; Utkus and
Young 2005). 
It is not surprising that 401(k) plans have
limited success in generating significant rates of
saving, particularly among low- and moderate-
income workers. Some industry statistics report
participation rates in 401(k)-type plans in the
mid-70 percent to low-80 percent range (Van-
guard 2004). About a third of eligible workers
save nothing (Hewitt 2005; Vanguard 2005).
Among participating workers, savings rates vary
widely, but average rates are low among both
lower- and higher-income savers. The typical
worker contribution is between 5 and 7 percent of
pay (Vanguard 2004; Purcell 2005). 
Recent calculations, however, paint a more
pessimistic picture. The GAO’s analysis of 2004
survey data finds a 36 percent participation rate
in defined contribution plans with half of work-
ers having account balances below $22,800 (just
$50,000 for workers age 55 to 64 and $60,600 for
those age 60 to 64) (GAO 2007). 
The GAO also notes that low-income work-
ers have less opportunity to participate in a plan
and less participation when a plan is available.
Under GAO projections, nearly 37 percent of
workers will reach retirement without any retire-
ment plan assets. The GAO estimates that 401(k)
plans could provide persistent savers with retire-
ment assets equivalent to 22 percent in replace-
ment income on average. But projections also
show that the bottom fifth of earners would prob-
ably have a replacement rate of only 10.3 percent
on average (with 63 percent having NO plan sav-
ings at retirement). The top fifth of earners would
have an average replacement rate of 34 percent
(GAO 2007). 
The workers most likely to use a 401(k) plan
are older, more-highly educated, and better-paid
(Smith, Johnson, and Muller 2004). Savings incen-
tives based on tax subsidies are not strong for
low- and moderate-income savers. Also, the
trend to 401(k) plans has reduced the net govern-
ment subsidies for saving because employee con-
tributions, their primary source of funding, are
subject to Social Security tax. Research reveals,
however, that Americans at lower income levels
can and do save when more relevant incentives,
such as matching contributions, are available
(Maki and Palumbo 2001; Duflo et al. 2005;
Sherraden and Barr 2005). 
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Less Plan Availability 
Workers can only participate in 401(k)-type plans
if their employers decide to offer one. No defini-
tive statistics exist on how many employers offer
this optional plan. The most comprehensive data
are found in federal tax forms that most employ-
ers are required to file for their plans (DOL 2008).7
The 2005 data recently released by the Depart-
ment of Labor indicate that 401(k)-type plans
account for almost 70 percent of all defined con-
tribution plans. Some 55 million workers, or less
than half of the full-time labor force, were cov-
ered by a plan.8
Most workers with a 401(k) plan worked for
large employers; more than 65 percent were
enrolled in plans with more than 1,000 partici-
pants. A 401(k) plan was the sole retirement plan
for 65 percent of workers. Among workers with
another plan, roughly half were in plans with
more than 20,000 participants, which means they
worked for very large employers. 
The failure of large numbers of employers,
especially medium and small employers, to offer
401(k)-type plans is discouraging. For decades,
Congress has struggled to create plans attractive
to all types of employers, especially very small
employers. Figure 1 illustrates the family tree of
available 401(k)-type plans.9 Large corporate
employers can choose a Standard 401(k), a Safe
Harbor plan, or the Safe Harbor Automatic
Contribution plan. Small corporate or sole-
proprietor employers have those same choices
plus a simplified version either through a 401(k)
plan, known as a “SIMPLE 401(k)” plan, or
through an IRA-based plan, known as a “SIMPLE
IRA.” Public-school and nonprofit employers can
choose any of those 401(k) and IRA-based op-
tions; they also have access to a separate family of
plans, known as 403(b) plans. In the 403(b) fam-
Figure 1.  The Family of 401(k)-Type Plans
401(k)
plans
403(b)
plans
457(b)
plans
Employer-
based
IRAs
Standard
SIMPLE
401(k)
Safe Harbor
Safe Harbor
Automatic
Contribution
Standard
Safe Harbor
Automatic
Contribution
457(b)
plan
SIMPLE
IRA
Safe Harbor
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ily, employers can choose a Standard 403(b) Plan,
a Safe Harbor plan, or the Safe Harbor Automatic
Contribution plan. State and local government
employers technically may not offer 401(k) plans,
but they may offer a 457(b) plan with a number of
similar features.10
Although many rules have been harmonized
in recent years, the different plan families fall
under different regulatory regimes. Table 1 de-
scribes the basic rules that apply to each plan
type. Significant differences can be seen in 
which workers are eligible for a plan, how much
they can contribute, whether employers match
contributions, and when workers become vested
in employer contributions. In addition, some
plan types require complicated administra-
tive and testing requirements, while others do
not.
The complexity of the current system deters
employers from sponsoring plans. Small employ-
ers, for example, cite costs and administration-
related issues as important reasons for not
sponsoring a plan (Munnell and Perun 2006). 
The standard 401(k) plan requires the services 
of lawyers, accountants, consultants, record-
keepers, communication specialists, and invest-
ment advisors to remain in compliance with the
law. The SIMPLE 401(k) and SIMPLE IRA are
specifically designed to keep administrative costs
low. In a recent survey of small employers,
however, more than 33 percent had never heard 
of SIMPLE plans, and another 20 percent had
heard of them but were not very familiar with
them (EBRI 2003). Simplicity comes at a cost—
lower contribution limits. Managers often decide
against this type of plan because they want the
greater tax deductions available through 401(k)
plans. Also, the lower limits effectively lower tax
subsidies. 
Even if a plan is offered, low- and moderate-
income workers are often excluded from partici-
pation. Employers with a standard 401(k) plan
design have a great deal of flexibility in deciding
which workers are covered. These plans must
pass a “lower the ceiling” test set by tax law.11 For
example, the plan must include a “good group” of
workers (that is, a sufficient percentage of lower-
paid workers in the employer’s workforce).12
And, plan benefits for lower-paid workers must
be “good enough” (that is, proportionate to those
received by highly paid workers). Therefore, the
amount higher-paid workers can save depends on
how much lower-paid workers save. This test
often obligates employers to allow in more lower-
paid workers and provide incentives, such as
matching contributions, to encourage higher rates
of saving. 
In reality, this plan design has proven mod-
estly effective at best. Depending on their demo-
graphic and organizational structure, employers
can legitimately exclude large numbers of low-
and moderate-income workers. The current rules
have not significantly expanded the participation
rates and benefits of moderately paid workers.13
This approach has been pushed a fair degree
already and likely will not be sufficient to scale
up the 401(k) plan system much further. 
SIMPLE and Safe Harbor plans use a “raise
the floor” approach instead.14 An employer must
provide minimum benefits for all workers, in-
cluding low-income workers. In exchange, these
plans are deemed to have satisfied tax law com-
pliance rules automatically, and highly paid
workers may contribute as much as they want up
to legal limits. Again, however, the contribution
maximum is often less than in the standard plans,
making these plans unattractive to many employ-
ers and highly paid workers.
To enable more low- and moderate-income
Americans to save more for retirement, the
United States will need a better 401(k) plan sys-
tem, one that features more plans, better plans,
and better incentives for saving. Today’s system
is one of cumulative advantage for higher-
income Americans who are more likely to have a
plan at work and to be included in that plan.
They receive generous tax incentives for sav-
ing, they are better able to navigate complex
savings decisions, and they have large account
balances that are less affected by plan fees and
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Table 1.  Basic 401(k)-Type Plan Rules
Plans
Who is eligible?
How much can
each employee
contribute?
Do employers
match employee
contributions?
Are there
alternatives to 
a match?
Can employers
make extra
discretionary
contributions?
Vesting for
employer
contributions?
Are there other
nondiscrimina-
tion rules?
Other rules
Standard
401(k)/403(b)
Employer decides; plan
must be available to 
a broad group of 
employees
Up to $15,500 ($5,000
more in catch-ups for
older workers)
Not required
See below
Yes, maximum employer
+ employee contribution
in 2008 is $46,000 per
account, (without catch-
ups)
3-year cliff or 2–6 years
graded
401(k) and matching
contributions for higher-
paid workers depend on
low-income workers’
contributions
SIMPLE
401(k)/IRA
All employees who
earned $5,000+ in prior
2 years and are expected
to do so in the current
year
Up to $10,500 ($2,500
more in catch-ups for
older workers)
Employer must match
100% of the first 3% of
pay contributed by each
plan participant
If no match, all eligible
workers get a 2%-of-pay
contribution
No; 2008 maximum allo-
cation per account is
$21,000 (without catch-
ups)
Immediate
No
Must have < 100 work-
ers; no other plan
Safe Harbor
401(k)/403(b)
Same as Standard plan
Same as Standard plan
Lower-paid workers get
at least a 100% match of
contributions up to 3% of
pay plus a 50% match for
contributions between
3% and 5% of pay
If no match, low-paid
workers get a 3%-of-pay
contribution
Same as Standard plan
Immediate, matching
and alternative contribu-
tions; standard schedule,
discretionary
No match beyond 6% of
pay; flat match required;
match for higher-paid
workers limited to lowest
rate for low-income
workers making same %
of pay contribution
Safe Harbor 
Automatic
Contribution
Same as Standard plan
Same as Standard plan;
if no opt-out, new partici-
pants must contribute
3% of pay in their first
year, 4% in their second
year, 5% in the third year,
and so on, but not more
than 10% of pay
Lower-paid workers get
at least a 100% match of
contributions up to 1% of
pay plus a 50% match for
contributions between
1% and 6% of pay
If no match, all low-paid
workers get a 3%-of-pay
contribution
Same as Standard plan
2 years, matching and
alternative contributions;
standard schedule,
discretionary
Same as Safe Harbor
plan
Note: The amounts expressed in dollars in this table are adjusted for inflation from time to time.
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costs. At each stage of the savings process,
today’s plans put low- and moderate-income
workers at a disadvantage, resulting in little or
no accumulations for retirement by those who
will need it most. 
The Need for a “Super Simple”
Saving Plan
Why is saving in America so complicated? Do
employers really need all these different plan
types? By shifting to defined contribution plans,
employers have signaled they prefer less fiduci-
ary involvement in their workers’ retirement
security. Realistically speaking, many employers
prefer merely to be facilitators of saving (Perun
and Steuerle 2005a). Moreover, the move to 401(k)
plans, with higher proportions of employee con-
tribution, has resulted in a loss of Social Security
tax subsidies that could have been shared by
employers and employees. This trend suggests
strongly that employers want simplicity, even if
they have to pay for it. 
We propose a radical U-turn in pension pol-
icy with a plan centered on employees, not
employers. After twenty-odd years of more plan
types, more bells and whistles, and more compli-
ance requirements—none of which has demon-
strably increased saving—it is time for a “back to
basics” approach. The fundamental building
block of the American saving system should 
be a plan that puts savers, especially low- and 
moderate-income savers, first. That means a plan
that makes the first step toward saving easy and
builds in advantages for lifelong saving all along
the way. 
In our view, four principles should guide the
design of such a plan: 
 Universality—all workers should have the
same opportunity to save, whether they
work for a corporation, charity, or the
government. 
 Equity—better incentives should be avail-
able to low- and middle-income workers
to create a more equal savings playing
field.
 Adequacy—tax law should focus primar-
ily on increasing the retirement assets of
low- and moderate-income workers rather
than policing the behavior of high-paid
workers.
 Simplicity—simpler designs that elimi-
nate most consulting and compliance 
costs would boost the return to saving for
workers. 
One model for a pension system that embod-
ies these principles is now being built in the United
Kingdom, which is confronting the same chal-
lenges of an aging society as the United States is. In
2006, the United Kingdom proposed a new system
for retirement income security based on three main
initiatives: strengthening the existing state pension,
building a strong system for private saving, and
encouraging longer work (DWP 2006a, 2006b,
2007). The first initiative was enacted in The Pen-
sions Act 2007, which made the retirement benefits
available through the state pension system more
generous, fairer to women and other caregivers,
and more widely available.15 Changes to the state
pension include decreasing the number of years of
work required to qualify for a pension to 30, in-
creasing benefits for inflation by wage growth
(rather than prices), and gradually raising the age
of eligibility to 68. The second initiative, which is
working its way toward passage by Parliament by
mid-2008, is intended to increase financial security
in retirement through private saving. It makes
partners of workers, employers, and the govern-
ment to increase the retirement assets for low- to
moderate-income workers (DWP 2006b, 2007). 
In the United Kingdom’s pension initiative,
employers will be required to contribute to a
retirement saving plan for every worker begin-
ning in 2012. Employers without a plan will be
required to enroll workers into personal savings
accounts. Workers will contribute a minimum of
4 percent of pay, employers 3 percent of pay, 
and the government 1 percent of pay through
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tax relief for an annual, minimum, combined 
8-percent-of-pay contribution to each account.
Employees can opt out of contributing to a
personal savings account but, by doing so, they
forfeit the employer and government contribu-
tions. In addition, employers need not con-
tribute for very low income workers on the
theory that their state benefits will provide a
high level of replacement income. Employers
who maintain a plan—either defined benefit 
or defined contribution—that provides equiva-
lent benefits are exempt from these new
requirements. The administrative and invest-
ment system for these accounts is still being
designed, but the intention is to provide simple,
low-cost accounts that deliver a high return to
saving. 
With the U.K. proposal and our design prin-
ciples as a guide, we can point the way toward a
better saving system for low- and moderate-
income workers: a Super Simple saving plan. It
uses the current SIMPLE design but, without
making it more complicated, scales up its fea-
tures. The result is a basic savings plan that
makes offering plans easier for employers while
rewarding saving by low- and moderate-income
workers. The Super Simple has four basic build-
ing blocks:
One: The Basic Saving Plan for Workers
The Super Simple would be universally available
to all employers, unlike today’s SIMPLE plans.
But like SIMPLE plans, all workers except very
short-term workers would be covered by the
plan.
Should the United States follow the U.K.
model and require employers to offer a plan?
Ideally, yes. All employers should be required to
offer the Super Simple unless they provide a dif-
ferent plan with equivalent benefits, just as in the
United Kingdom. But the U.S. private pension
system has always been voluntary, partly because
of burdensome costs on small employers. An
optional system made sense when defined bene-
fit plans, which require an uncertain, long-term
financial commitment, were dominant. The
switch to defined contribution plans presents an
opportunity to rethink this issue as we move to a
system with an employee-centric plan and a lower
cost structure. 
Republicans and Democrats have struggled
with this issue before and at times have come out
favoring systems that were essentially manda-
tory. Dodging the issue of what happens to Social
Security in the future, for instance, President
George W. Bush favored an individual account
plan that involved mandated deposits to retire-
ment saving accounts. President Bill Clinton pro-
posed a system of universal saving accounts with
an automatic government contribution for low-
income workers—which essentially made them
mandatory. 
Perhaps, as part of a broader set of reforms to
address an aging society, mandated saving will
be re-introduced. Viewed by itself, however, we
may be able to achieve most of the gains of a
mandatory system while essentially allowing
some employers to defer action. For some small
and temporary employers, for instance, complex-
ity remains a problem. Regardless of whether it is
mandatory, simplifying and improving the cur-
rent system is an important step toward a saving
system that is more tolerable for employers. 
The New U.K. Pension System
 Employers will be required to enroll work-
ers automatically into a workplace plan or,
if no equivalent plan is available, a personal
savings account.
 Workers are allowed to opt out.
 Employers must contribute at least 3 per-
cent of pay on earnings between (roughly)
$10,000 and $65,000.
 Employers can keep their current plans
(defined benefit or contribution) instead if
they provide equivalent benefits.
 Workers must contribute at least 4 percent
of pay.
 Government contributes 1 percent through
tax relief.
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Would the Super Simple replace today’s mul-
tiple 401(k)-type plans? Again, ideally yes. We
view the Super Simple as an important tool for
expanding coverage and building retirement
assets for low- and moderate-income people. We
recognize that some employers might prefer to
keep their standard 401(k) plans. So we propose
grandfathering existing standard 401(k) plans
and retaining their testing requirements. But all
standard 403(b) plans and SIMPLE and Safe
Harbor plans would convert to Super Simples.
We expect that many, if not most, employers
would convert their 401(k)s to Super Simples
because of the simpler design and more generous
provisions. Employers and workers would bene-
fit from the redesigned and more generous gov-
ernment match, the higher contribution levels
than allowed in today’s plans, and the removal of
more complex discrimination tests. 
The Super Simple would be simpler and
cheaper to administer than many of today’s
plans. By keeping costs down, more employer
benefit dollars would flow into workers’ ac-
counts rather than to the plan compliance indus-
try. We believe these combined incentives would
succeed over time in making the Super Simple
the dominant defined contribution plan. 
Two: Automatic Saving Features
The Pension Protection Act blessed several new
features for 401(k) plans that many believe are the
best hope for raising savings rates in decades.16
The most popular is “auto-enrollment,” which
enables employers to enroll workers automati-
cally into a pre-programmed saving schedule
unless they decide to opt out. The theory behind
auto-enrollment is that it takes advantage of
demonstrated behavior patterns of individuals
responding to choices, and, as a consequence,
both increases the number of workers who save
and the amount they save. 
Auto-enrollment is one of the most prom-
ising new ideas in the private pension system,
but, like a ball sitting on top of a hill, it needs
some additional force to get rolling effectively.
The Super Simple does that by making auto-
enrollment a basic plan feature. Workers may opt
out of contributing to a plan, but plans must con-
tain this feature. 
The Super Simple Saving Plan
Plan Design
 Simple, low cost
 No annual testing or reporting
 Designed to replace all other 401(k)-type plans
except the standard 401(k), which, through
simple amendment, can adopt the Super
Simple structure and take advantage of its
simpler and more generous provisions
Availability
 Available to all employers
 Covers all but very short-term workers
 Automatic enrollment with opt-out for 
workers
Contributions
 Higher contributions than standard 401(k)
plans 
 Employee contributions permitted up to an
annual limit minus employer contributions
 Like existing SIMPLE plans, required minimum
contribution for employers adopting this plan
structure; higher contributions permitted if a
uniform percentage of pay for all employees
 Government matching contribution for low-
income savers deposited into accounts
through the tax system
 Reconfigured government match for most
savers
 Employer and government matching contribu-
tions restricted for retirement; employee contri-
butions available for distribution with limitations
O P P O R T U N I T Y  A N D  O W N E R S H I P  P R O J E C T
10
What should the baseline saving formula be?
There is no one answer for all workers. How
much individual workers should save for a secure
retirement depends on many personal factors,
including their other financial resources. And
how much individual workers can save depends
on their other obligations and financial needs. The
United Kingdom has settled on a 4-percent-of-pay
contribution from workers, which seems reason-
able. We suggest specifying a 4-percent-of-pay
contribution in the first year and then escalating it
to 8 percent through annual or, perhaps, biennial
1-percent-of-pay increases as workers spend more
years on the same job. 
Would employers be able to set a higher base-
line contribution rate for workers? Yes, but to pre-
vent employers from setting rates beyond the
reach of most low- and moderate-income work-
ers and discouraging their participation, impos-
ing the 10 percent limit now found in the Safe
Harbor Automatic Contribution plan seems sen-
sible. Workers would always have the option to
contribute more or less than the automatic saving
formula suggests.
Three: New Savings Incentives 
As promising as they are, automatic saving fea-
tures are not likely powerful enough by them-
selves to raise retirement assets sufficiently for
low- to moderate-income workers. Hewitt Asso-
ciates reports that “most automatically enrolled
employees remained at the default contribution
rate and thus added less to their 401(k) plan than
employees who contributed through traditional
enrollment.”17 In addition, some employers have
found that, without matching or other employer
contributions, too many account balances remain
small. The small balance problem is a concern. It
increases the costs of maintaining plans per dol-
lar invested and reduces the net return to saving
for workers.18
The federal government projects a conserva-
tive take-up rate for auto-enrollment. The Joint
Committee on Taxation, a nonpartisan agency of
Congress, estimates that automatic enrollment
arrangements will cost about $500 million in 2010
and $800 million in 2014 (Joint Committee on
Taxation 2007a). Some of those losses will result
from the tax preferences for interest income on
additional accumulations. Assuming that the
$500 million loss in 2010 is solely for additional
net contributions and assuming an average tax
rate of, say, 20 percent, the additional annual
contributions projected by the Joint Committee
would equal about $2.5 billion in 2010. Although
this amount is not trivial, it still represents only
an additional $20 or so a year per worker.19
Realistically speaking, low- and moderate-
income workers will need more than very small
tax incentives on their savings to build signifi-
cant assets for retirement. Existing tax incentives
increase with income, making them far less val-
uable to low- and moderate-income workers
than to higher-income workers. Many do not
benefit from other saving rewards available in
standard 401(k) plans. If there is an employer
match, for example, workers often do not stay
with one company long enough to be vested
because they are short-service or part-time work-
ers. The Super Simple, therefore, builds in three
different rewards to saving to boost the account
balances of low- and moderate-income workers
significantly: 
 a mandatory, fully vested, minimum con-
tribution from employers in return for
higher contribution limits for all employ-
ees, including the highly compensated
 an improved incentive system including a
better government matching contribution
oriented toward low-, moderate-, and
middle-income savers 
 employer and government matching con-
tributions delivered to accounts and re-
stricted from distribution until retirement
First, we adopt the “raise the floor” approach
of Safe Harbor and SIMPLE plans so, in return for
a fully vested floor contribution by employers, all
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workers can contribute as much as they like, 
up to the legal maximum. These plans offer
employers a choice: either a minimum matching
contribution or a minimum across-the-board con-
tribution to all participants. There is no perfect
formula for the Super Simple. In the SIMPLE
plan, employers must match 3-percent-of-pay
contributions or give an automatic 2-percent-of-
pay contribution. The Safe Harbor plans require
a total contributions match up to 3 percent of pay
plus 50 percent of contributions between 3 to 
5 percent of pay or a 3-percent-of-pay automatic
contribution. The Safe Harbor Automatic Con-
tribution plan requires less: a total match of 
1-percent-of-pay contributions plus 50 percent of
contributions between 1 to 6 percent of pay or an
automatic contribution of 3 percent of pay. 
Outside these plans, the most popular match-
ing schedule in standard 401(k) plans seems to be
a 50 percent match up to the first 6 percent of pay
contributed (PSCA 2007). The U.K. proposal
requires a 3 percent automatic employer contri-
bution rather than a match. 
We believe that some employers, particularly
small employers, will initially be resistant to any
substantial required contribution, despite the
Super Simple’s lower cost structure. So we pro-
pose an initial automatic, minimum employer
contribution of 3 percent of pay, or any matching
formula that would achieve the same end, given
the minimum amount already contributed by the
employee.20 The 3 percent employer minimum
combined with the 4 percent employee minimum
would give low- and moderate-income workers
annual contributions of at least 7 percent before
the government match. An employer could con-
tribute more, but only if the same percentage of
pay is given to all employees.
The Super Simple also offers something more
for higher-income workers: higher contribution
levels. The maximum contribution would be
much more generous without the distinction be-
tween employer and employee contributions. In
2008, workers can only contribute up to $15,500
from their own funds; counting employer contri-
butions, a total of $46,000 can be contributed to an
individual account.21 The Super Simple would
allow all workers to contribute up to a flat dollar
amount, such as $46,000, minus any employer
contributions. Contribution levels would be
monitored and enforced through the tax system,
relieving employers of an administrative burden.
Enabling higher-income workers to contribute
more without complicated testing requirements
would make the Super Simple an attractive alter-
native to today’s standard plans. 
A second set of incentives, this time from the
government, would provide much more effective
subsidies than the existing saver’s credit. As in
the British proposal, we suggest establishing a
basic government match for contributions by
low-, moderate-, and middle-income workers.
Although PPA permanently extended the saver’s
credit, it did not extend its reach. The saver’s
credit gives a sliding scale tax credit for contribu-
tions by low-income workers. The maximum
credit is $1,000. To claim the credit, a worker must
owe taxes, and only a few low-income workers
are actually eligible for the credit. Despite pre-
tenses of progressivity, the saver’s credit costs
little because it grants little to most employees. It
is time, therefore, to admit that the saver’s credit
is largely symbolic and move onto something
more substantial and more realistic to administer. 
We are not wedded to any particular form
here. One possibility would be to provide a gov-
ernment matching contribution equal to a given
percentage of employer and employee contri-
butions up to some low amount—for example, 
20 percent of the first $2,000 of deposits to 
each account. If the employer and worker con-
tribute a total of $2,000 (say, on 10 percent of pay
for a worker earning $20,000), the government
subsidy would effectively equal $400. 
Another approach might simply be to adopt
the British method and provide something like 
a 1-percent-of-pay match. Combined with the 
3 percentage-point employer contribution and 
4 percentage-point minimum employee contri-
bution, some 8 percent of pay would then be
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deposited into private contribution plans. The
government match could apply to, say, the first
$20,000 of wages. Other alternatives are possible,
such as a 2-percent-of-pay match on the first
$10,000 of wages. Unlike the British, we would
make the credit available at the lowest income lev-
els, unless or until we also undertook a Social
Security reform that provided minimum benefits
or other greater protections to low- and moderate-
income workers. 
What is important, however, is that the
match should represent a greater percentage of
pay for lower-wage individuals (in the above
examples, this is achieved by capping the possi-
ble credit). It should also be provided in a form
that is easy to administer, while maintaining the
money within the retirement saving structure. If
the credit amount is known with moderate cer-
tainty, then taxpayers do not run into what might
be called the “earned income tax credit prob-
lem”: the inability during the course of the 
year to know how much subsidy is going to be
available. 
Although the existing saver’s credit may at
first appear more progressive, it is hardly avail-
able to most savers. Also, since it is not directly
deposited into a retirement account, it does little
or nothing to provide retirement protection. The
sample credits we demonstrate here stretch fur-
ther up the wage scale, but, as noted, they partly
replace Social Security tax subsidies that applied
to most contributions to defined benefit pen-
sion plans. To avoid paying these credits at the
highest wage levels, one could also calculate 
the maximum Social Security tax as net of these
credits, or raise the maximum contribution limit
for income tax deferral at a slower rate over 
time. 
This saver’s credit option might also be tied
into a reform of the Social Security tax exclusion
and its somewhat-arbitrary application to em-
ployer but not employee contributions. However,
this goes beyond the subject of this report, as var-
ious new options would work to supplement the
other parts of the Super Simple plan. 
Finally, we propose that government match-
ing contributions be delivered directly to ac-
counts through the tax system under a separate
record-keeping system maintained by financial
service firms. In addition, because the Super
Simple is intended to build assets for retirement,
we propose that both employer and government
matching contributions be held in accounts for
that purpose. Employees could withdraw from
their own savings with limitations similar to
those in effect today. We think it makes sense to
reverse the current 401(k) plan practice where
employees can usually access their employer’s
contributions after a number of years but their
own contributions are restricted until age 591⁄2. If
we ask employers who opt into a Super Simple
plan to contribute toward their employees’ retire-
ment, then those funds should be dedicated to
that purpose. We also want to encourage employ-
ees to save throughout their careers but assure
them access to their contributions for major life
goals or unexpected emergencies.
Four: Deregulation 
In our view, the “lower the ceiling” design has
outlived its usefulness. The pension system has
tried to woo employers into sponsoring plans by
letting them choose which workers participate
and what benefits are available. But then tax law
scrutinizes those choices to make sure employers
haven’t loaded the dice for highly paid workers.
This elaborate cat-and-mouse game has been
largely ineffective in protecting the interests of
lower-paid workers. And, as the empirical evi-
dence behind opt-out reforms indicates, com-
plexity greatly deters participation.
For many employers, the relevant considera-
tion is not choice but cost. Deregulating plans
through simplification can lower plan costs sig-
nificantly. The Super Simple adopts several “raise
the floor” design features and adds more:
 There are no tests to ensure the plan cov-
ers a “good group.” All workers except
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those earning nominal wages (for exam-
ple, $5,000 or less) are eligible.
 There is no need to track a worker’s
employment history. All contributions
(employer and worker) are fully vested.
 There are no tests or adjustment of contri-
butions by higher-paid workers. Because
the plan offers a uniform employer contri-
bution to all, higher-paid workers can con-
tribute up to the legal limit.
 There are no annual reports to be filed
with the government. Contributions by
both employers and workers are reported
on W-2s. With simple credit design, work-
ers can adjust excess payments, or in some
cases, insufficient matching contributions,
on their 1040 forms.
The Super Simple by design includes all
workers, provides saving incentives beyond in-
come tax deferral, ensures ownership of em-
ployer contributions for short-service workers,
simplifies plan administration, and makes com-
pliance with tax rules automatic. The trade-off for
requiring a floor of benefits for lower-paid work-
ers is raising the ceiling on how much higher-
paid workers can contribute. 
The result is a simpler plan with reduced
expenses that increase the net return to saving
for workers. By reducing most employer choices
and the need to police those choices, the Super
Simple minimizes administrative and regulatory
requirements, relieving the employer of fiduci-
ary liability as well. It also frees up the benefit
dollars now used to pay for compliance services
in today’s heavily regulated plan universe—
dollars that could be contributed to workers’
pensions instead. Perhaps most important, it
integrates a private pension reform into a
broader reform of old age pensions, including
Social Security—whether done simultaneously
or separately.
The Super Simple is designed to work for all
savers, not just those with high incomes. But we
also recognize that many of our examples of
potential parameters could and should be de-
bated by reasonable people. Topics open for dis-
cussion are the size of the minimum employer
contribution for employers opting into this sim-
pler world and the automatic contribution sched-
ule for workers. There is no one absolutely right
choice. Other issues, such as the appropriate di-
vision of responsibility for saving between work-
ers and employers, require ongoing political 
and economic decisions concerning broader
Social Security and private pension reform. The
British White Paper to which we have alluded
offers private pension and Social Security reform
together.
The Super Simple saving plan shows that it is
possible to redesign employee saving plans
around four critical principles. The Super Simple
is much more universal, providing most workers
with a convenient opportunity to save for retire-
ment. It is fair: lower-income workers receive at
least the same rate of contribution and match as
higher-income workers. And low-income work-
ers have better access to a plan than they typically
do today. The Super Simple is adequate: it gives
lower-income workers real, relevant incentives to
save and leverages their contributions through
employer and government contributions. And
the Super Simple plan is simple. It is not one more
patch onto an already complex pension universe
with yet more complicated testing procedures. 
While this is only one hypothetical design,
this type of plan points the private pension sys-
tem toward including more workers, making
saving simpler and more automatic, and building
a stronger retirement saving base for those who
need it most. If the Queen can give her royal
assent to a minimum level of private retirement
assets for her subjects, surely we Americans can
figure out a way to do as well for ours. 
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Notes
1. SIMPLE is an acronym for Savings Incentive Match Plan
for Employees, a simplified 401(k) or IRA available to
small corporate or sole proprietor employers. 
2. Sen. Mike Enzi, Wyoming Republican and then Chair 
of the Senate’s Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
Committee, quoted on August 3, 2006, at http://www.
cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/08/03/congress.pensions.
ap/index.html.
3. See ICI (2006), GAO (2006), and Joint Committee on
Taxation (2007b) for descriptions of the multiple services,
fees, and expenses that apply to 401(k)-type plans today.
4. Fees charged to 401(k)-type plans for investment, admin-
istrative, and other necessary services have sparked the
latest wave of litigation by class action lawyers against
plan sponsors. Several recently filed lawsuits have
charged that the fee structure for these plans is often
excessive, opaque to employers and employees alike, and
filled with conflicts of interest. See Wasik (2006) and Kathy
Chu, “Charges Can Be Hard to Find,” USA Today,
November 10, 2006 (available at http://www.uselaws.
com/news/news.php?id=57) for more information about
this litigation. 
5. The term “401(k) plan” refers to a specific type of plan
authorized by the Tax Code under IRC § 401(k). It pro-
vides workers with an opportunity to save on a tax-
preferred basis. The Tax Code also authorizes different
types of employers to offer similar employee saving plans
under separate statutes. For the sake of simplicity, this
report will refer to all such plans as a 401(k) plan or a
401(k)-type plan.
6. This is not to say, however, that inertia is the sole cause or
even the most important cause of low saving rates. Turner
and Verma (2007) indicate that inertia can explain a failure
to participate in only about a third of such workers. They
suggest that traditional economic factors such as low
income or low incentives play a larger role than inertia.
7. Many nonprofit employers, churches, and state and local
governments are not required to file these forms. The DOL
data also exclude the filings of one-person plans, which
are often found among the self-employed, or IRA-based
SIMPLE plans. The DOL data reported above are based on
the authors’ calculations. 
8. In 2005, there were about 116 million full-time workers
over age 16 in the U.S. labor force (DOL 2005). 
9. Multiple plan families are an anachronism from the 
days when defined benefit plans dominated the pension
system. Pension law included different funding and de-
duction rules for employers with different tax attributes—
that is, for-profit, nonprofit, and government employers.
Even though defined contribution plans do not pose the
same risk of tax abuse, pension law retains much of the
tradition for separate legal rules for 401(k) plans spon-
sored by different types of employers.
10. Because 457(b) plans differ significantly, from a legal per-
spective, from other 401(k)-type plans, they will not be
discussed further in this report.
11. For most plans, these rules are found in IRC §§ 401(a)(4),
401(k)(3) and 410(b).
12. The “good group of workers” test is rarely a problem for
401(k) plans because passage is measured by the number
of workers eligible to contribute, not those who actually
do.
13. The economic rationale and effectiveness of non-
discrimination rules has recently been questioned by
Brady (2007).
14. The concept of a “raise the floor” approach first became a
feature of pension law during the Clinton administration
with the creation of the SIMPLE plan for small employers.
During that period, the IRS implemented an optional test-
ing method in its nondiscrimination rules under which
low- and moderate-income workers are guaranteed a
minimum benefit. Treas. Reg §1.401(a)(4)-8(b)(1)(vi). Per-
sonal communication, J. Mark Iwry, former benefits tax
counsel in the Clinton administration.
15. For more information, see http://www.dwp.gov.uk/
pensionsreform.
16. Employers had been experimenting with similar features,
although not on a large scale, for the past decade. Before
PPA, however, there was some uncertainty about their
legality under state law. In PPA, Congress amended pen-
sion law to clarify that federal, not state, law governs such
features. These new rules are found in ERISA § 514 (e). 
17. “Auto Enrollment May Soon Be Standard Feature of
401(k) Plans,” http://www.plansponsor.com/pi_type10/
?RECORD_ID=37807.
18. Kathleen Pender, “Automatic Enrollment in 401(k),” The
San Francisco Chronicle, August 8, 2006 (available at http://
www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/
archive/2006/08/08/BUGDAKCNQ51.DTL&type=
business. As one industry study recently confirmed,
“measured per dollar of invested assets, costs for plans
with a small average account size will tend to be higher
than similarly sized plans with a larger average account
size,” and “participants in plans that have many small
accounts will typically pay higher fees per dollar invested
than plans with fewer and larger accounts” (ICI 2006, 
5 and 11).
19. The projections by the Joint Committee may prove wrong
for various reasons. Largely ignored in the literature,
employees pay Social Security payroll taxes on their plan
contributions while employers do not. Thus, the Joint
Committee may also be assuming that some employee
contributions displace employer contributions in an
expanded world of automatic enrollment. This would
decrease the net tax subsidy provided per dollar of contri-
butions but also reduce net government cost if contribu-
tions increase. How or whether this worked into the
Committee’s calculations, we don’t know. The main point
is that many plans that depend more heavily on employee
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contributions also may cause a reduction in the govern-
ment (Social Security) subsidy for retirement saving.
20. Suppose, for instance, an employer offered a 100 percent
match up to 6 percent of pay. The employee opting into
the plan would already be contributing 4 percent, as-
suming that was the minimum parameter set in the law.
Accordingly, the employer match would be a minimum
of 4 percent of pay if it chose this particular match rate.
21. This change might appear to take away an incentive for
more employer contributions for lower-paid employees.
Current rules for employer contributions, however, do not
necessarily result in uniform allocations to employees by
pay. Employers can take advantage of exotic testing meth-
ods such as cross-testing and Social Security integration
that significantly skew contributions to the high-paid. If
this change seems too generous to higher-paid employees,
it would be better to increase the floor of employer contri-
bution significantly than to keep the current rules.
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